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ABSTRACT
Poland's housing and  macroeconomic policies have  restricted
investments  in housing and urban infrastructure  to a level  well below
that of other European  countries.  This has resulted  in a shortage  of
housing typified by  15  to  20 year waits for government-subsidized
housing  and a stock  of housing  that  falls  short  of the  number  of Polish
households  by about  20 percent. Shortages  of this  magnitude  are likely
to cause distortions  that extend far beyond the housing sector,  with
impacts  on patterns  of savings  and consumption,  the price  level,  and  on
the functioning  of labor  .narkets--all  of which have potentially  major
macroeconomic  implications.
This paper  focuses  particularly  on  how housing  market  distortions
are transmitted  to labor markets,  with impacts  on rates  of migration,
relative  wage levels  among different  regions,  and, by implication,  on
the productivity  of the Polish  work force.  The basic thesis  of the
paper is that if housing markets are prevented from reaching their
competitive  equilibrium  that  labor  markets  will  similarly  be
prevented.  The paper examines  evidence  cn the extent  of housing and
labor  market  disequilibria,  and  estimates  econometric  models  that  relate
internal  migration  and relative  wages  to alternative  measures  of housing
market  disequilibria. From these  analyses  it is concluded  that labor
markets are  in fact distorted by  housing market distortions,  with
potentially  major  macroeconomic  costs.
The paper concludes  with a number  of recommendations  for policy
reform.
While the empirical  results  have direct  relevance  to Poland, it
is  likely  that  the  thesis  of the  paper  has relevance  not  only in other
centrally  planned economies,  but in other economies  where government
housing market interventions  such as rent control  or restrictive  land
use and building  regulations  prevent  housing markets from reaching  a
competitive  equilibrium.HOUSING  AND  LABOR  MARKET  DISTORTIONS  IN POLUND:
LINKAGES  AND POLICY  IMPLICATIONS
I.  INTRODUCTION
The  housing  situation in  Poland  has  long  been  one  of
imbalance,  with persistent  housing  shortages  despite  large  subsidies  to
the housing sector.  These imbalances  have many costs  to the economy.
Increased  investments  in  housing  could  lead  to higher  GNP  growth  than  do
alternative investments; incremental rates  of  return  on  housing
investment  may be as high as 15 to more than  30 percent,  extremely  high
by international  standards. Another  way to look at the direct  benefit
to the economy from housing investment  is to calculate  the value of
construction  required  to eliminate  housing  deficits;  at a minimum  they,
benefits are about 40 percent of Poland's  gross domestic product.!
Moreover  restrictions on  private  housing  production  and  poorly
structured  subsidies  dampen household incentives  to save for housing
purchases,  and thus they may reduce  the supply  of domestic  savings  to
the rest of the economy.  Furthermore,  housing  subsidies,  particularly
off-budget  housing  finance  subsidies,  contribute  to inflation.
It  may  also be the  case  that  housing  market  distortions  result
in  labor  market  distortions with  further penalties in  economic
performance. Our thesis  is that in an economy  in which  housing  markets
are prevented  from reaching  competitive  equilibrium,  labor  markets  may
also be kept from their competitive  equilibrium. This paper examines
this  prospect and  then, based  on  our  analysis of  the  resulting
macroeconomic  costs, suggests some  implications  for hcusing policy
reform.
While the arguments  advanced  concerning  induced  labor  market
distortions  resulting  from  housing  market  distortions  are shown  to have
particular  relevance  in Poland,  the  basic  arguments  are likely  to apply
more broadly. This  is particularly  true in centrally  planned  economies,
which have systematically  restricted  housing  and related  infrastructure
investments. Moreover,  it is possible  to argue by analogy  that other
sorts  of government  housing  market  ;nterventions  such  as rent  control  or
particularly  restrictive  land use and building  codes can have similar
distorting effects on  labor markets, raising wages and  decreasing
productivity.
1/  See  Mayo (1987)  for  an explanation  of these  estimates.-2-
II.  MOU  HOUSING  KARKET  DISTORTIONS  AFFECT  LABOR  MARKETS
Our model is a simple  one.  In market  economies  labor seeks
its highest  return  by moving  to areas with higher  wages.  This process
allows  more prodrctive  firms,  industries,  and areas  to  outbid  their  less
productive  coen.  t-parts. The  assumption  is that  households  will be able
to find housing that will accommodate  their move, at a  price that
permits  their  real .ncomes  to increase. If the  price  of housing  is too
high  for  mobility to  occur, two  kinds  of  adjustments  may  occur:
(1)  either  more housing  will be built,  reducing  real housing  costs,  or
(2)  wages will adjust upward further to compensate  workers for high
housing  costs.  In market  economies,  the  empirical  evidence  is thut  the
elasticity  of housing  supply  is  high enough  such that  housing shortages
would be expected  to be el:ainated  relatively  quickly  as a result  of
increased  supply. In non-market  (centrally-planned)  economies  there  is
no  necessary presumption that this would  occur.  If  insufficient
resources are  devoted to  housing, housing disequilibrium  could be
extreme,  with  high excess  demand  and prices  well above  costs,  and  little
housing adjustment.  Instead,  wages would have to adjust in order to
provide a  compensatory  differential to workers for housing to bear
higher  housing  costs.  These  costs  could  include  higher  housing  prices,
longer  work commutes,  and poorer  ho/sing  conditions  such as low  housing
quality  and doubled-up  households.2
To preview what follows,  after describing  Poland's  housing
situation, we  argue  first  that  Poland's housing  market  is  in
disequilibrium  by showing  that  housing  prices  greatly  exceed  costs,  that
the country's  rate of investment  in housing is low compared  to other
countries  at similar  levels  of development,  and that  housing  investment
has not responded  to disequilibrium. Second,  using a simple  model of
net  migration,  we argue  that  the  housing  market  disequilibrium  depresses
labor mobility.  Third,  using an  earnings  regression  model,  we show
that  housing  market  disequilibrium  affects  wage rates.  We conclude  the
paper  with a discussion  of suggested  near  and  medium  term  housing  policy
reforms  compatible  with Poland's  economic  situation.
2/  Societies  incur  costs  from  these  disequilibrium  wage
differentials.  Firms  pay wages  higher  than  competitive  wages.  On
the  other  hand,  although  households  receive  higher  wages,  they  are
forced  to consume  a suboptimal  bundle  of goods  and services. Wage
differentials  are not therefore  indicative  of real differentials
in welfare.  Detailed calculation  of  these welfare losses is
beyond  the  scope  of this  paper.-3-
III.  BACKGROUND
The two dominant  features  of housing  in Poland  are shortage
and subsidies.  Housing output in Poland  has in relative  terms been
lower than that of almost all countries  with similar incomes.  The
result is that among the twenty-eight  largest  Economic  Commission  for
Europe (ECE) countries in 1980, Poland ranked last in terms of the
number of housing units relative to households,  with about eighteen
percent  more  households  than  housing  units. On-budget  housing  subsidies
represent  a major portion of government  expenditures  (thirteen  percent
in 1985), ranking behird only food among consumer subsidies.  When
account is taken of off-budget  interest  subsidies,  the housing sector
may rank  as the  most prominent  area of consumer  subsidies.
The  most  striking feature of  the  Polish housing sector,
however,  is the shortage  of housing  units relative  to households.  In
1984, there were 12.08 million households in Poland but only 10.25
m.llion  occupied  dwelling  units,  a  shortfall  of  1.83  million
dwellings.  Of this latter  number,  most (1.27  million)  were in urban
areas.  Such shortfalls  find expression  in waiting  lists  for state  and
cooperative housing where,  in  1986,  there were  roughly 3  million
households  signed  up--not  only  doubled-up  households  but  also households
wishing  to improve  housing  quality,  space,  or location. Average  waiting
times for cooperative  housing  in large cities  (Warsaw,  Katowice,  etc.)
are reported  to be from fourteen  to fifteen  years,  and in the citi-es
with the shortest  waiting times (small cities in southern Poland),
households  could expect to wait five to six years for a cooperative
apartment.
The  housing  deficits  that exist  now can be best  understood  in
historical  and comparative  perspective. As a result  of the destruction
of World War II, Poland  emerged with one of the most severe  housing
deficits in Europe--households  exceeded housing units by about 1.5
million units at a  time when the stock comprised  about 5.5 million
units.  In the early years after the war, reconstruction  proceeded
slowly. By 1960,  Poland  still  had  one  of the  highest  relative  shortages
of housing in Europe with 25 percent more households than housing
units--a  deficit  of about 1.2  million units.  In relative  terms,  only
the U.S.S.R. (with a  29 percent deficit), the  Federal Republic of
Germany (28 percent  deficit), and the German Democratic  Republic (25
percent  deficit)  were close  to the  levels  of relative  shortage  exhibited
by Poland  in 1960.
Housing shortage ratios (measured in terms of  households
relative  to dwellings)  in these four countries  with the most serious
war-related  deficits,  which  are  compared  to those  of other  ECE  countries
in Table 1, were well above the median ratios for all countries in
1960--1.03  for western countries and  1.16 for socialist countries.
After 1960,  housing production  increases  decreased  housing  deficits  in
both  western and  socialist countries.  By  1970,  parity  between
households  and dwellings  had been achieved  in Western  Europe  and North-4-
Table  1:  HOUSING  SHORTAGES  IN SELECTED  R.C.R.  COUNTRIES
(Ratios  of Households  to Dwelling  Units)
Year
Country  1960  1970  1980
North  America  and  WeFtern  Europe:
Austria  1.04  0.96  0.92
Belgium  U.97  0.97  0.94
Canada  0.99  0.99  0.99
Denmark  1.08  1.00  0.99
Fed.  Republic  of Germany  1.28  1.09  1.01
Finland  1.11  1.02  1.00
France  0.93  0.85  0.87
Greece  0.97  0.86  0.79
Iceland  1.12  1.09  0.95
Ireland  1.09  1.08  1.04
Italy  1.00  0.95  1.01
Luxembourg  1.03  0.98  0.93
Netherlands  1.09  1.01  0.99
Norway  0.92  0.85  0.84
Portugal  0.99  0.84  0.73
Spain  1.00  0.98  0.99
Sweden  1.00  0.98  0.90
Switzerland  1.04  0.98  0.90
United  Kingdom  1.02  1.00  0.96
United  States  0.93  0.95  0.95
Median  1.03  0.98  0.95
Eastern  Europe:
Bulgaria  1.10  1.14  1.08
Czechoslovakia  1.16  1.08  1.01
German  Democratic  Republic  l.25  1.09  1.02
Hungary  1.16  1.10  1.08
Poland  1.25  1.16  1.18
Romania  1.16  1.15  1.12
U.S.S.R  1.29  1.09  1.05
Yugoslavia  1.14  1.07  1.02
Median  1.16  1.10  1.07
Source: Calculated  from  Tables  1.6  and  .II.1,  United  Nations  Economic
Commission  for  Europe  (E.C.E),  (1986).America  (the  median  ratio  of households  to  dwellings  was  0.98),  and
deficits  had been  reduced  in socialist  countries,  to a median  ratio  of
1.10. The reduction  in  housing  deficits  was particularly  striking
between  1960  and 1970  for  the three  countries  other  than  Poland  that  had
suffered  the  most serious  war-related  shortages. Poland  had  however
fdllen  to last  place  among  the  countries  of Table  1 in 1970,  with 16
percent  more  households  than  dwellings. From 1970  to 1980,  housing
deficits  continued  to fall  in both  Western  Europe  and the  socialist
countries,  with the  median  ratio  of households  to  dwellings  reaching
0.95 in the  West  and 1.07  in socialist  countries. By 1980,  virtual
parity  between  households  and  dwellings  had been  achieved  by several
socialist  countries--Czechoslovakia,  the  German  Democratic  Republic,  and
Yugoslavia. In Poland,  by contrast,  the  housing  de&  it  was  as high in
percentage  terms  in 1980  as it  was in 1970,  with  18  percent  more
households  than  dwellings.
These  housing  deficits  have proven  to be intransigent  to
considerable  efforts  by the  Poles  to reduce  them  since  the  early
970s.  In 1972,  for  example,  the  Sejm (the  Polish  parliament)  announced
comprehensive  program  to expand  housing  production  from  an annual
level  of  output  of 6.5  dwellings  per 1000  people  in 1971-1975  to 9 per
1000  people  in 1976-1980  and to 11  or  more per 1000  people  in 1981-1990.
Table  2 indicates  actual  output,  in terms  of both  dwellings
per 1000  people  and  numbers  of dwellings  completed  annually. During  the
1970s,  p-oduction  goals  were  met,  with  output  equal  to 6.7  dwellings  per
1000  people. Ir the  late 1970s,  production  was climbing  toward  the  goal
of nine  dwellings  per 1000  people,  and  attained  a peak  of 8.1  dwellings
pcr  1000  people  during  1978,  when  numerical  output  also peaked  at
284,000  dwelling  units. In the  next  three  years,  and  mirroring  general
economic  conditions  in Poland,  output  fell  by about  one-third  to a level
that  had been  typical  of the  1960s. Output  has  barely  recovered  from  a
nadir  of 186,000  dwelling  units  in 1982  (5.1  per  1000  population).
There  are three  major  s  3yrces  of housing  in Poland:  state,
cooperative,  and  private  housing.-  Over time  the  relative  importance
of supply  from  each  of these  sources  has  varied  as a reflection  of the
state's  role in  the  housing  supply  system. Before  World  War II,  most
housing  was  supplied  privately. After  the  war,  the state  began  to
3/  A fourth  sJurce  of housing--built  by industrial  establishments  for
their employees--was  an  important  source of supply during the
1940s  and 1950s.  It is still used where housing shortages  are
critical. We have no separate  statistics  to identify  this source
of housing,  but it could be as much as 12 percent of the 1978
total housing stock if it is the same as the category "other
socialized  housing"  in  Poland's  statistical  yearbook.
Ciechocinska  (1987) reported that, as of 1978, 7.7 percent of
Warsaw's  apartments  were  owued  by enterprises.- 6 -
produce  and finance  an increasing  share  of new housing. Beginning  in
the  late 1950s,  the state's  role  shifted  towards  sponsorship  of
cooperative  housing  rather  than  state  housing,  and  by 1965  cooperative
housing  had  become  the  major  source  of  new supply. The existing  stock
.f  housing  continues  to reflect  the  pre-war  legacy  of private  housing;
in 1978,  private  housing  made  up 49.6 percent  of the  housing  stock,  with
the  remainder  roughly  equally  divided  between  state  and  cooperative
housing.
Table  2:  RECENT  TRENDS  IN HOUSING
SECTOR  OUTPUT
Dwellings  Completed
Year  per 1000  Population  Number
1970  6.0  194,000
1971  5.8  191,000
1972  6.2  206,000
1973  6.8  227,000
1974  7.4  250,000
1975  7.3  248,000
1976  7.7  264,000
1977  7.7  266,000
1978  8.1  284,000
1979  7.9  278,000
1980  6.1  217.000
1981  5.2  187,000
1982  5.1  186,000
1983  5.4  196,000
1984  5.3  196,000
1985  5.2  193,000
Elsewhere  (see  Mayo, 1987)  we have discussed  both the factors
inhibiting  housing output in  Poland, and  some of the macroeconomic
implications of  housing shortages.  Among  the  most  apparent are
potentially  reduced economic growth, as a  result of foregoing  high
return  investments  in  housing  and infrastructure;  reduced  incentives  to
save  and  invest by  households, because of  housing subsidies and
government  restrictions  on housing and infrastructure  investment;  and
increased  inflationary  pressures,  because  of large  off-budget  subsidies
for housing  and persistent  excess  housing  demand.  These  macroeconomic
impacts  are  all  potentially  large  and  consititute sufficient
justification  for  major  housing  policy  changes.  Tney fail,  however,  to
capture  the  full  extent  of  macroeconomic distortion created  by
inappropriate  housing policy.  In particular,  it seems likely that
housing market distortions  are propagated  through labor markets, by
distorting  patterns  of internal  migration,  commuting,  job search,  and
wage structures.  Were it possible to establish the existence and
magnitude  of such  labor  market  distortions,  it  would  increase  the  stakes
of undertaking  housing  policy  reform.  In the following  three  sections
we explore  the  nature  and  extent  of labor  market  distortions  as they  are
indu-ed  by housing  market  distortions.-7-
IV.  A MODEL  OF HOUSING--INDUCED  LABOR  MARKET  DISTORTIONS
The  model we use to identify  the linkages  between  the  housing
and  labor markets in Poland contains three components:  (1) housing
market  disequilibrium,  (2)  migration  flow disequilibrium,  and (3)  labor
market  disequilibrium. In this section  we will examine  the evidence  on
distortions  in  each of these  markets.
A.  Is  There  Housing  Market  Disequilibrium?
We  argue  that  the  housing market  is  shown  to  be  in
disequilibrium if  (1)  housing  prices  exceed  costs,  (2)  housing
investment  is too low, and (3) housing investment  does not respond  to
the  housing  shorcage. The first  two  aspects  of disequilibrium  are  taken
up here; the chird aspect is discussed with the other statistical
analyses  in  section  V.
Do Prices  Exceed  Costs?
There  is  a vast  discrepancy  between  what housing  appears  co be
worth and what most people  pay for it.  The deficits  in housing  have
produced  a situation  in  which  housing  that becomes  available  on the  free
market  often sells  for prices  well in excess  of construction  costs;  at
the same time, however, and  in part because of the housing subsidy
system,  households  living in the existing  housing stock are spending
unusually low  fractions of  income for  housing  relative to  what
households  in similar  non-socialist  countries  spend,  and  relative  to the
cost of  new free-marKet  housing  within  Poland.
Information  on  free-market housing  prices  is  largely
anecdotal,  but available information  indicates  that prices  of housing
units  that trade  on the  free  market  (potentially  up to about  60 percent
of  the  stock) are  well  in  excess  of  costs  of  construction or
replacement. For  example,  discussions  in 1986  with officials  of housing
cooperatives  and their national  association  indicated  that relatively
large units (80-100  square  meters) in older coops (built  in the late
1950s)  in Warsaw  had recently  sold for prices  of from 120,000-150,000
zlotys  per square  meter.  Selling  prices  for newer  units  were said to
depend  on unit size,  with smaller  units  selling  for  about  60,000  zlotys
per square  meter and larger  units,  which are reh 7tively  more scarce,
selling  for  about  120,000  zlotys  per  square  meter.-  Independent
4/  Ciechocinska  (1987)  indicated  that the price of flats in Warsaw
averaged 100,000 zlotys per square meter in 1985, and that a
"typical  flat"  for a family  of three  could  be assumed  to be about
5 million  zloty-s.- 8 -
conversations  with private  citizens  in  Warsaw  confirmed  that  such  prices
are typical  for free  market  sales  and are also  consistent  with black
market  prices  of rental  housing.
Prices  at these  levels  appear  to be well  above  construction
costs. Nationwide,  cooperative  construction  costs  averaged  about  24,000
zlotys  per square  meter  in 1983-1984. Since  that time,  construction
cost  indices have  risen by about 59 percent, so current costs are
estimated to be about 40,000 zlotys per square meter.  In Warsaw and
other large cities,  costs  are reported  to be higher,  perhaps  in  a range
of 50,000 to 75,000 zlotys  per square  meter.  Thus it appears  that the
market  gyice  of  housing  can  exceed  construction  costs  to  a considerable
degree.-
Is Investment  Less than Investment  in Similar  Countries?
Poland's level of investment  in housing has been lower than
that  of other countries  with  either similar  levels  of GNP per capita  or
similar  levels  of  housing  deficits. Table  3 illustrates  housing
Table 3:  HOUSING INVESTMENT  RELATIVE TO CDP
IN  SELECTED  COUNTRIES
(Percent)
Year
Country  1970  1975  1980
Czechoslovakia  4.95  5.27  4.01
Hungary  4.11  5.99  5.59
Poland  3.89  4.34  5.52
Romania  n.a.  4.67  4.59
Yugoslavia  5.76  6.77  7.76
Creece  6.60  5.36  5.76
Source: Residential  construction  statistics  were  taken  from
the  United  Nation's  National  Accounts  Yearbook.
Construction  variables  for  socialist  nations  are  the  sum  of
gross  investment  in  owner-occupied  and  non-communal
housing.  Gross domestic product estimates for socialist
nations were taken from World Bank Staff Working Papers.
The sources  are:  (a)  Zbigniew  Fallenbuchl,  1985;  (b) Peter
Havlik and Friedrich  Levcik,  1985; (c) Edward  Hewett,  1985;
and (d)  Marvin  Jackson,  1985.
5/  Such differentials  between  cost and price are indicative  of high
real rates of return to housing investment (perhaps 15 to more
than 30 percent) and suggest  the welfare losses  associated  with
not allowing sufficient  resources to be invested  in the housing
sectcr.investment  relative  to GDP for five socialist  countries  and for Greece
(which  has relatively  similar  GDP  per  capita)  for 1970,  1975,  and 1980.
As  the table indicates,  Poland's comparative  investment  performance
ranked behind each other g2untry in 1970 and 1975 and exceeded  only
Czechoslovakia  and  Romania.-
Such  comparisons  can  sometimes  be misleading,  however,  because
it is well known that the share  of nationia  income  invested  in housing
varies  systematically  with per capita  GDP.-  The relationship  observed
for earlier  periods,  for  example,  had been that of an inverted-U,  with
the  share  of output  devoted  to housing  investment  first  rising  with  GDP
per capita  and then falling  beyond  a certain  level.  To gauge  Poland's
comparative  performance,  Figure  1 illustrates  the "normal"  relationship
estimated  to exist  between  housing  investment  and  GDP  per  capita  and the
observed  levels  for Poland,  the comparator  countries  of Table 3, and a
number  of other  countries  with similar  incomes. To simplify  comparison,
the "normal"  relationship  is illustrated  only for 1975 (although  per
capita  GDP is expressed  in 1981  US$),  and  tLe share  of h?using  in total
output  (housing  investment  to  GDP) is showing  for 1975._
The  figure indicates that Poland's level of investment in
housing in 1975 was nearly 1.5 percentage  points (about  25 percent)
below the  "normal"  relationship  between  housing  investment  and  GDP, for
its level  of GDP per capita.  While  Czechoslovakia  was also beluw the
norm in 1975, it had a less serious  quantitative  housing  deficit  than
Poland  in 1975,  and hence  less pressure  to increase  investment. Of the
other socialist  countries,  Romania had a  comparative  housing deficit
most similar to Poland in the 1970s,  and yet was able to devote a
substantially  higher fraction  of national  income  to housing  invastment
than  was Poland. This  is particularly  noteworthy  given  that  at
6/  Recall that by 1980,  Czechoslovakia  had achieved  virtual  parity
between dwellings and  households,  thereby lessening effective
demand  for investment.
7/  See, for example,  the discussion  of the well-known  Burns-Grebler
relationship  between  housing investment  and per-capita  GDP in S.
Mayo,  S.  Malpezzi,  and  D. Gross  (1986).
8/  The  "normal" relationship is  based on  a  regression equation
relating  the share  of housing  in total  output  to GDP per capita,
population  growth  rates,  and rates  of growth  of urban population
to total population  for a sample  of 48 countries,  following  the
functional  form  described  in  Leland  Burns  and Leo  Grebler  (1976).- 10  -
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Notes  to  Figure  1:  Data  on  GDP  per  capita  were  based  on  official
excLange  rates  in 1981.  The  "normal"  relationship  portrayed  moreover  is
based  on  substituting  into  the  estimated  equation  mean  values  of
population-related  variables  for  Europe  and  North  America#  rather  than
for  all  countries  on  which  the  equation  was  estimated.  Socialist
countries  in  the  sample  are  indicated  by  the  following  letters:
C  =  Czechoslovakia,  H  =  Hungary,  P  =  Poland,  R  =  Romania,  and
Y = Yugoslavia.  Greece, shown for comparison,  ib indicated by the
letter  C.- 11  -
Romania's  lower  level  of GDP  per  capita,  it is expected  that comparat-
ively lower levels  of  investment  would be forthcoming.  Yugoslavia's
housing investment  has, similarly,  exceeded  considerably  the norm for
countries  with similar  income  levels. Thus on average  Poland  appears  to
have been investing  relatively  less than both countries  with similar
income  levels  and countries  that have had similar  housing  deficits  in
the  recent  past.
B.  Is  There  Labor  Market  Disequilibrium?
We argue  that  labor  markets  are  distorted  if there  is  evidence
that  (1) internal migration is less than should be  expected, and
(2)  wage rates  are distorted.  In this section,  we examine  evidence  on
Polish internal  migration  and wage rates relative to those of other
countries,  and find some support for the existence of labor market
disequilibrium.  The next section  examines  the evidence  more closely
based  on econometric  models  of both  migration  and  wage rates.
Is The  Flow  of Labor  Affected?
Poland's labor market, like that in many centrally-planned
economies,  has often shown signs of excess  demand.  The Polish labor
force grew more slowly  than population  in the 1970s and 1980s.  The
World Bank  (1987) analysis of  the  labor market argues that labor
turnover  rates  of around 20 percent in the 1980s  have been relatively
low  given  significant  labor  shortages,  and suggests  that  the low  rate  of
turnover  may be due to housing  shortages  that limit labor  mobility  and
to modest wage differentiation  between most industrial  sectors which
results  in little  incentive  to change  jobs.
Limited labor  mobility  in Poland  has not been the result  of
explicit policies limiting migration.  Administrative controls on
migration  to large  cities  were put into  effect  in 1954  and rescinded  as
late  as  1984  in  Warsaw,  but  analysts argue  the  controls  were
unenforceable  and  ineffective in  stemming migration (Ciechocinska,
1987).  A  policy of  both active and  passive decentralization  of
industrial  establishments  from large  cities to towns  and rural areas,
attempted  during  the  mid-1950s  until  1970,  was also ineffective,  as many
workers  declined  to  move to their  establishments'  new  locations  because
of  insufficient  housing in  the new  locations,  among other reasons
(Ciechocinska,  1987).
Policies  labeled "lagged urbanization"  (Jedraszko,  1983) or
"economizing  on urbanization"  (Ofer,  1977)  have provided  the government
of Poland  with the instruments  of an implicit  migration  policy.  Ofer
(1977)  argues that socialist  countries  restrict  urban investments  in
order to maximize investment  resources allocated to industry.  The
planners  thus  restrict  the  levels  of urban  infrastructure  and services- 12  -
per migrant,  including  investment  funds  allocated  to housing,q/  and use
high capital-to-labor  ratios in urban industries.  Reduced levels  of
urban investments  leads to "migration  substitution"  (Fallenbuchl,  1977)
or commuting  from  rural  residences  to urban  workplaces,  an important  and
large  phenomenon  in Poland.
Internal  migration  in Poland,  as in most socialist  countries,
tends to be lower than in market economies.  For example, in 1971
internal  migration  per 1COO  population  in Poland  was 26.7,  while it  was
65.2 in  the  U.S.A. and  60.9 in West Germany (Fallenbuchl,  1977).
Poland's  rate of internal  migration  was similar  to that of Hungary  and
Czechoslovakia  but  higher  than that  of East  Germany,  which  was 15.4  per
1000  population  in 1971  (Fallenbuchl,  1977).
The rate of total internal  migration  per 1000 population  in
Poland  has declined  steadily  since  the 1950s.  Up until 1973,  the rate
of rural-rural  migration  exceeded the rate of rural-urban  migration.
Rural-rural  migration has acted as a form of migration substitution,
when housing  in  urban  areas  has been  unavailable  for  migrants. Frenkel
(1983) estimates that in the period 1960-1970 sixty percent of the
movement of labor from farm to non-farm  work involved such partial
abandonment  of  farm work.  In  1978, about one-half of  the rural
population  was  employed in non-agricultural  sectors.  The  cost of
commuting  to work for this group,  however,  has been high and has hurt
labor  productivity  (Fallenbuchl,  1977;  Jedraszko,  1983).
From 1946 to 1985, net (rural-urban)  internal  migration in
Poland totaled almost 6 million people, an annual average of about
150,000  people. These  population  shifts  can be divided  into  three  main
periods: two high net-migration  periods (1946-1953  and  1970 to the
present)  and  one low  net-migration  period  (1954-1970)  (Frenkel,  1983)..
In the first period of high net-migration,  1946-1953,  net
migration  averaged 174,000  annually.  Poland  went through  land refojrm
and changes  in agricultural  policy.  Land reform  created  a majority  of
small landholders in  farming, which  at  first  reduced rural-urban
migration.  Later in the period, the government  forced  deliveries  of
agricultural  products  and attempted  farm collectivisation,  stimulating
the  flow  of population  out  of rural  areas.
The  period 1954-1970 was  one of  low net-migration,  which
averaged  104,000  annually.  The pace of industrialization  slowed  down,
and the  government  began  its policy  of industrial  decentralization.  A.;
a result  of the  administrative  controls  placed  on migration  to large
9/  We found,  for example,  a strong  statistical  correlation  of 0.71
between  1980  per  capita  housing  investment  and 1985  net  migration
per  1000  population.- 13 -
cities  which began in this period,  there  was an increase  in commuting
from  rural  homes.
In the period  since  1970,  net migration  has averaged  176,000
annually,  although  since  1980 it  has declined  to 146,000  people,  due to
the  slowdown  in  the  economy  and lower  investment  levels  in both industry
and  housing.  During the  1970s, rapid growth  in non-agricultural
investments  and  output  spurred  rural-urban  n.igration,  as  did
agricultural  modernization,  increased  mobility of  older farmers who
handed over their land in return for pensions,  the entry of Poland's
baby-boom generation into the labor force, and the acceleration  of
housing  investments.
To sum up, throughout  the post-war  period  in Poland,  a whole
range of policies--industrial,  agricultural,  and urban--have  had both
direct and  indirect  effects on migration rates.  In section V, we
present  the  results  of our  model  component  of migration  as a function  of
demographic  variables,  wages,  and the  housing  shortage.
Are  Wage  Rates  Distorted?
The World Bank (1987) analysis of the Polish labor market
finds that "in spite of goods shortages  the household sector  is more
responsive  to real  wages  than are firms",  providing  evidence  that labor
responds  to  wage  variations.
The  level  of wage  dispersion  across  aggregate  economic  sectors
in Poland is high when compared to Western  market economies  and even
when  compared  to  other  East  European  countries;  by 1976,  the latest  year
available  for  comparison,  Poland  had the  most unequal  earnings  structure
among its East European neighbors (Askansas and Levcik, 1983).  A
significant  factor  in this  dispersion  is the  favored  position  of mining
in the wage structure;  the mining wage is almost twice that of the
average  manufacturing  wage.  Within  the manufacturing  sector,  Poland's
wage dispersion  is lower than in Western market economies  but still
higher  than  in other  East  European  countries,  as indicated  in  Table  4.
Regional-level  (voivodship)  data on average  monthly  wages for
1985 in all  sectors and in the industrial  sectors is presented in
Table  5.  The coefficient  of variation  indicates  that average  regional
industrial  wages  were more  variable  across  voivodships  than  were  average
regional  all-sector  wages.
Our analysis  of the relationship  between  wage rates and the
housing  shortage,  presented  in the  next section,  uses a model  of wages
as a function  of a region's  industrial  mix and housing shortage.  We
found  a strong  and robust  relationship  between  these  factors.
V.  EMPIRICAL  MODELS
In this section  we test three  behavioral  models,  designed  to
answer  the  following  questions:- 14  -
1.  Does  housing  investment  respond  to  housing  market
disequilibrium?
If no, the presumption  is that adjustment  to labor  market
disequilibrium  is more likely  to occur through  impacts  on
migration  flows  and thence  on wage structures.
2.  Is  migration  influenced  by housing  shortages?
If no, then one may conclude  that wage differentials  are
sufficient  to have offset  the reluctance  to migrate.  If
yes,  there  may be assumed  to be costs  to both industry  and
individuals  of reduced  mobility,  costs  which industry  will
attempt to  offset by  offering higher wap-eOs  to  induce
workers  to  migrate  despite  housing  shortages.  -
3.  Are  wages  influenced  by housing  shortages?
If  yes,,  then  one  may  conclude that  relative to  the
situation  in  market  economies  wages  are  distorted--too  high
in some regions  and industries  and too low in others,  with
the  result  that  productivity  and  output  suffer.
Table  4:  STANDARD  DEVIATION  RELATIVE  TO AVERAGE
EARNINGS  IN  THE MAIN AND INDUSTRIAL




Poland  15.1  19.5
Bulgaria  12.5  15.7
Czechoslovakia  13.4  15.2
Hungary  7.7  15.0
Romania  9.1  12.7
USSR  18.8  17.3
Source: Table  10.3,  Askansas  and  Levcik  (1983).
10/  Industries  may respond  in one of two ways--
either  by offering  higher  money wages or by
offering  higher  non-wage  benefits,
particularly  company housing.  This latter
possibility  seems to have been increasingly
common  in recent  years,  though  the  data were- 15  -
table S.  Average  Monthly  Oages  in  Poland,  1995.
,xasasxas:ss:s:;:zagg:a:as"aunaaa  masa::s#
1985  Average  monthly
Wa9ge  (zlotys)
Yoavodships  Total  Industrial
POLAND  20,005  22,566
Warsaw  City  20,477  21,318
Biala  Podlasks  17,055  17,197
Bialystok  17,611  18,311
Bielsko-Bila1  18,837  19,777
3ydogoszcz  18,209  18,611
Chels  17,135  17,030
Ciechanow  17,135  17,263
Czestochowa  19,101  20,114
Elblag  18,783  19,519
Gdansk  20,018  22,438
Sorzow  18,627  18,932
Jelenia  Gora  18,916  20,394
Kalisz  17,668  18,206
Katovice  27,450  33,259
Kielce  17,698  18,808
Konin  19,830  23,691
Koszalin  18,239  18,655
Krakov  City  19,836  22,097
Krosno  17,260  17,853
Legnica  22,751  28,116
Leszno  18,477  18,319
Lublin  19,380  19,401
Lobza  16,524  17,210
Lodz  City  19,073  19,856
Novy  Sacz  17,115  18,723
Olsztyn  17,791  17,772
Opole  18,778  19,473
Ostroleka  17,101  17,967
Pila  18,100  18,514
Piotrkow  19,477  21,537
Plock  17,916  19,251
Poznan  19,156  19,901
Przemysl  17,039  17,436
Rados  18,073  18,985
Rztstow  17,996  19,094
Siedlce  17,358  17,851
Sieradz  17,451  19,202
Skiernivwice  17,609  18,377
Slupsk  19,240  18,821
Suvalki  17,690  17,793
Szczecin  19,439  21,109
Tarnobrzeg  19,162  22,024
Tarnov  17,963  19,444
Torun  17,937  18,409
Walbrzych  20,560  23,057
Wloclawtk  17,609  18,149
Wroclaw  19,059  19,685
tamosc  16,995  17,413
Zielona 6ora  18,387  18,787
Weighted  Average  20,005  22,566
Minimus  Value  16,524  17,030
falieum Value  27,540  33,258
Standard  Deviation  1,719  2,804
Coeff. of Variation  9S  12t
uuu322a:3EaE3Raz2::ua=::u3g:33:u:2gwaSS|s2uu- 16  -
In each of the three  components  of our model  we have used
regression  analysis  to  test  the  significance  of relationships  between
the  housing  and  labor  markets,  with  the  data  described  in  Annex  A.  In
each  case  we  have  found  rupport  for  the  model.
Our empirical  model uses the subnational  region  in Poland
called the "voivodship"  or district  as  the  geographical  unit of
analysis. In 1975,  the  boundaries  of the voivodships  were  altered  to
create  a  total  of  49  voivodships  from  what  had  been  22  voivodships.  The
large  cities  in Poland--Warsaw,  Lodz,  Krakow,  and Poznan--with  their
surrounding  towns  are  also  classified  as  voivodships.
A.  Housing  Investment  and  the  Housing  Shortage
We have already  established,  in section  III, that housing
market  disequilibrium  exists  in  Poland. it  remains  to  establish  whether
housing  investment  responds  to  the  disequilibrium.  The  answer  requires
a  model  of  housing  investment  as  a function  of the  housing  shortage  and
indicators  of housing  need.  If the  housing  market  behaves  "normally",
we  would  expect  investment  to  respond  positively  to  both  factors:
Housing  Investment  = f(Housing  Shortage,  Housing  Needs)
(+)  (+)
We examine  two  types  of housing  investment  in the  model:  (1)
1981  per-capita  housing  investment  by the  socialized  sector  (HINV)  and
(2) 1981 per-capita  housing investment  by the nonsocialized  sector
(NSHINV).  The  housing  shortage  variable  is  the  number  of  households  per
100  dwelling  units  in 1980  (HHPER). Housing  needs  are  measured  by an
index  of the  age  distribution  of  the  population,  the  ratio  of  births  per
1000  to deaths  per  1000  population  in 1980  (AGEINDEX),  and  by  an index
of new housing  demand,  marriages  per 1000 plus divorces  per 1000
population  in  1980 (NEWHHDEX).  Results of  equations  describing
socialized  and  nonsocialized  housing  sector  investments  are  presented  in
Table  6.
Housing  investment  does  not  respond  positively  to the  housing
shortage,  either  in  the  socialized  sector  which  controls  the  majority  of
investments,  or in the unplanned  nonsocialized  sector,  which in a
socialized  economy  should  behave  most  like  a normal  housing  market. The
demographic  variables  ACEINDEX  and  NEWHHDEX  are  significant  in  their
relation  to nonsocializle  housing investment  but, counter to  our
expectation,  negatively.-  These  results  suggest  that  "market  signals"
11/ The lack of a  relationship  between  housing  investment  and the
housing  shortage  may  be  due  in  part  to  the  separation  of investment
planning  for  housing,  which  is  controlled  at the  voivodship  level,
and industrial  investment  planning,  controlled  at the national
level. For  a discussion  of the  problems  of physical  (settlement)
planning  vis-a-vis  economic planning  in  Poland, see Andrzej
Jedraszko  (1983).- 17  -
Table  6:  RESULTS  OF HOUSING  INVESTMENT
REGRESSION
Independent  Dependent  Variable
Variables  HINV  NSHINV
CONSTANT  4.138  5558.048**
(2.946)  (1364.906)
HHPER  -0.01  -10.938
10.938
(0.03)  (13.778)
AGEINDEX  -0.002  -3.624*
(0.004)  (2.039)
NEWHHDEX  -0.001  -29.353**
(0.008)  (3.929)
Adjusted  R2  0.00  0.69
Standard  Errors  in  parentheses
*  =  significant at 0.90 level
**  =  significant  at 0e99  level
concerning housing shortages and  incremental  demand are  not  being
translated  into increased investment.  Indeed the fact that the R2
statistic  for HINV is equal to zero is a  confirmation  of the basic
observation  that housing  investment  is occurring  in a way that is less
than  rational.
B.  Net  Migration  and Housing  Market  Disequilibrium
If housing market disequilibrium  affects the labor market
through compensatory  differentials  for higher housing costs that are
incorporated  into  the  wage  rate,  then  this  not  only  affects  the  existing
labor  pool,  but  also  the  ability  of establishments  to attract  labor  from
other regions.  Labor migration is thus an intermediate  link in the
relationship  between the housing and labor markets.  We use several
simple  models  of migration  to  examine  this  relationship.  In  each of the
models tested,  migration  is treated  as a function  of the  wage level  in
the  region  and of alternative  measures  of recent  changes  in the  housing
shortage  in  a region.- 18  -
The basic model that we test is one in  which we expect  that
net migration is positively  related  to the wage level in  an area but
negatively  related  to increases  in the  housing shortage.  Three simple
models  are presented  in Table 7.  In the first two,  net migration  per
1000 people in 1985 (MIGPT) is expressed  as a  function of the 1985
all-sector  wage index  (WAGEINDEX)  and of two  measures  that are expected
to  be  related  to  recent  changes in  housing shortages, dwelling
completions  per capita  in 1980  (DC80)  and  housing  investment  per capita
in 1981 (HI81).  In the case of each of the latter  variables,  it is
expected  that  the  higher  its  level,  other  things  equal,  the  greater  will
have  been  the  reduction  in the  housing  shortage  ratio.  Problems  of data
availability  prevented  using  contemporaneous  measures  of the latter  two
variables. Based,  however,  on examination  of data for  earlier  years  on
both  dwelling  completions  and housing  investment,  there  appears  to be a
high  degree  of year-to-year  correlation  in such  data?  such that  data for
1980  and 1981  are  expected  to  provide  reasonable  pri,.:  for  more recent
periods.
A third  model is cast in terms  of changes  in both  wage levels
and in the  housing  shortage  ratio.  In it,  MIGPT is expressed  in terms
of the  difference  between 1978  and 1981  housing  shortages  (HHDIFF),  and
the difference  between 1984 and 1985 average  a3gregate  monthly wages
(WACEDIFF). The expectation  is that  migration  is positively  related  to
changes in the wage level and negatively related to the change in
housing  shortage.
Table  7  presents the  results of  our  regressions.  The
dependent  variable  in  each  case is  net  migration  per 1000  people  in 1985
(MIGPT),  positive  if there is net in-migration,  negative  if net out-
migration.
In columns  (A)  and (B)  the results  of the  two models  based  on
the  wage level  and recent  housing  investment  (or dwelling  completions)
are  shown. Although  the  models  have  only  moderate  explanatory  power  (R2
=  0.41 and 0.35),  both the housing  investment  and wage level  variables
have the expected  sign and are statistically  significant. Higher  wage
levels  and greater  levels  of investment  in housing  are associated  with
higher  levels  of  migration.
Column  (C)  presents the  results of  the  model  which  is
estimated  iQ  terms of wage and housing shortage  changes.  The HHDIFF
variable  is the 1978  housing  shortage  subtracted  from the 1981 housing
shortage;  an increase  in the  variable,  therefore,  represents  an increase
in the  housing  shortage. The  model  gives  basically  the same  results  as
the  other two  models,  with a similar  degree  of explanatory  power  (R2  =
0.31) and  indicating that more  rapidly changing wage  levels are
positively  associated  with migration,  but that migration is deterred
when  housing  shortages  are  increasing  more rapidly.- 19  -
Table  7:  RESULTS  FROM  NET  MIGRATION  REGRESSIONS
Independent  Dependent  Variables
Variables
(A)  (B)  (C)
MIGPT  MIGPT  MIGPT
CONSTANT  -9.536  -9.578  -7.732











Adjusted  R2  0.41  0.35  0.31
Standard  errors  in parentheses
*  =  Significant at 90% level
=  Significant  at 95%  level
=  Significant  at 99% level
In sum,  although  our model  of migration  flows  in Poland  is  a simple
one, explaining  only  a small  part  of the  variation  in interregional  migration,
it suggests that housing shortages  influence  net migration patterns in a
manner consistent  with our model: households  appear to move in response  to
wage differentials  but are deterred  from doing so when housing  shortages  are
great.
C.  The  Wage  Rate  and  Housing  Market  Disequilibrium
The  above  sections  have shown  that  the  housing  market  has  been
in persistent  disequilibrium,  and  that the  interregional  labor  supply  is
depressed  by the  housing  disequilibrium. Are workers  then compensated
for housin3  cost differential?  The analysis  of the most direct link
between  the housing  and labor  markets in our model indicates  that they
are.  Higher  average  wages  do tend  to be associated  with greater  housing
shortages.- 20 -
We use a modified earnings  regression  model to examine the
relationship  between wage rates and housing shortages.  An earnings
regression  associates  the  wage level  with the industrial  or occupational
mix within a region.  We add an indicator  of the housing shortage  to
measure explicitly the  relationship between wages  and  the  housing
shortage.  The model uses three different  wage indices:  the aggregate
wage,  the  industrial wage,  and  the  construction sector wage.  A
logarithmic  functional  form was used so that the coefficient  estimate
for  the  housing  shortage  represents  the  elasticity  of the  wage rate  with
respect  to the  housing  shortage.
Table  8 shows  the results  of the earnings  regressions  of the
aggregate relative wage  (WAGEINDEX), the  industrial relative wage
(WGINDDEX),  and  the  construction relative wage  (WGCONDEX),  on  che
housing  s1jrtage  (HHINDEX)  and  the  appropriate  industry  mix
categories._  Four  aggregate  economic  sectors--industry,  construction,
transportation  and communications,  and trade--were  used to construct  the
respective employment share variables MIXIND, MIXCON, MIXTRANS, AND
MIXTRADE.  Eight industrial  subsectors--energy  and fuel,  metallurgy,
electrical  machinery and electronics,  chemicals,  minerals, paper and
pulp, light industry,  and food processing--were  used to construct  the
respective employment :hare variables MIXENERGY, VIPMETAL, MIXELEC,
MIXCHEM,  MIXMINERAL,  MIXPAPER,  MIXLIGHT,  AND  MIXFOOD.,'
The  regression  results  are  broadly  supportive of  our
hypotheses. In all  three  of the  different  equations  explaining  relative
wages the sign of the housing shortage  variable  is positive.  In the
case of  the  equation for  the  overall average wage  the  estimated
elasticity  of relative  wages  with respect  to housing  shortages  is 0.32,
but insignificant.  In  the case of  the industrial  wage index, the
estimated  elasticity  is equal  to 0.725  and is highly  significant;  in the
case  of the  construction  wage index,  the  estimated  elasticity  is 1.002,
12/  In the case of the construction  sector  wage, subsector  industry
share  data were  unavailable by  voivodship, so  the  relative
construction  wage is  regressed  only  on the  housing  shortage.
13/  To prevent  collinearity  problems  in the earnings  regression  for
the  industrial  wage,  the  food  processing industry share was
omitted  from  the  regression.- 21 -
Tahle  8:  RESULTS  FROM  EARNINGS  REGRESSIONS
Dependent  Variable
Independent  (A)  (B)  (C)
Variables  LOG  WAGEINDEX  LOG  WGINDDEX  LOG  WGCONDEX
CONSTANT  3.1  0.887  -0.097
*  (1.70)*  (1.082)  (1.845)
LOG  HHINDEX  0.322  0.725  1.002























Adjusted  R2  0.47  0.86  0.10
Standard  errors  in  parentheses
*  =  Significant at 90% level
=  Significant  at 95% level
=  Significant  at 99% level- 22  -
and is also  highly  significant.141 Thus in the  case of the two specific
industrial  groupings,  a one percent  change  in the housing  shortage  ratio
is  associated  with a change  in wage levels  of from between  seven-tenths
of one percent  to  one percent.
These results  are lLausible  in their  patterns  across  industrial
groupings  in that they follow from two simple and intuitive  notions  of
how the elasticity of wage differentials should be expected to vary
depending on  the elasticity of demand for labor and the demand for
housing.  The  pattern one  finds, for example is one  in which the
elasticity  of wages with respect  to housing  shortages  is lowest for  the
aggregate,  city-wide, wage,  and  is  higher  for  the  two  specific
industries--"industria-"  and construction.  The resposiveness  of wage
rates to housing shortages  will depend on two key economic pararleters
that  affect  the supply  curve  and the  demand  curve  for labor.  If housing
shortages shift the labor supply curve to a greater degr-:e  for some
occupations  or industries  than others, then the equilibrium  wage rate
will shift relatively  more in the face of a given labor demand curve.
Also,  if  the  demand curve  for  some  occupations or  industries is
relatively  more inelastic  than for others, then a given shift in the
labor supply curve will  tend to  produce a greater response in  the
equilibrium  wage in  those  groups  characterized  by more inelastic  demand.
The relationship  between  housing  demand  and the  degree  to  which
housing  shortages  will shift  the supply  curve for  labor is  determined  by
the  magnitude of  the  compensatory wage  differential that  will  be
demanded by workers of a given type in response  to being required to
accept less than eptimal quantities of housing.  While this depends
ultimately on  the parameters of the utility functions of workers of
different  types,  and little  empirical  research  is available  that informs
us about this issue in Poland,  general research indicates  clearly that
housing is a  "normal good", one for which in  coe  increases lead to
increases  in the  quantity  of the good demanded.H-  This appears to be
no  less lt ue  in  centrally  planned  economies  than  in  market
economies.-  Thus  one  would expect  that  workers  who would in
14/  We  also  tried  two  other  housing  shortage indicators in  the
regressions:  urban households per 100 urban dwellings and rural
households  per 100 rural  dwellings.  Two of the three  wage indices
(those for the aggregate and  the  industrial wage) had greater
elasticities with  respect to  the  "composite" housing shortage
indicator than to the separate urban and rural housing shortage
indicators.  It is interesting  to note, however, that the rural
housing shortage  index  had a stronger  relationship  to the  wage rate
than did the city housing shortage index.  This indicates that
rural  areas,  where  the  primary  source of  housing  is  private
construction,  face  more severe  housing supply  constraints  than do
urban  areas.
15/  See, for  example,  S.  Malpezzi  and S.  Mayo (1986).
16/  See,  for  example,  Daniel (1983).- 23 -
equilibrium  demand greater quantities of housing would demand greater
compensatory  wage differentials  in  the face  of quantitative  restrictions
on the availability  of housing.  This suggests  in turn that  workers in
higher wage categories,  for whom optimal  housing consumption  is higher,
would  demand higher  compensatory differentials, and  thus  that  the
elasticity of wage rates with respect to housing shortages for such
workers  would be  higher than  that for lower-wage  workers.
From the first  earnings  regression  presented  in Table 8, it is
apparent that  the  industrial category that  is  associated with  the
highest aggregate wage  level is that of "construction",  followed by
"industry" (the coefficients of  the  industrial share  in  these two
categories are  significant and  positive).  Thus  the  patterns  of
coefficients  observed (which indicate that construction  wages are more
responsive than those of industrial  wages and that those in turn are
more responsive  than  those  of wages in  general to  housing  shortages)  are
consistent  with the relative ranking of wages (and implicitly  of the
required  compensatory  differential)  by industry.
The other parameter that influences the sensitivity  of wage
levels  to  housing shortages  is the elasticity  of demand  for labor.  For
industries  with inelastic  demands for labor,  a given shift in the labor
supply  curve  will produce  a larger  change  in  equilibrium  wages than  will
be the case in industries  with elastic demands.  In general  one would
expect that capital-intensive  industries  such as those represented  in
the  "industrial"  category  here  (such  as  energy  and  numerous
manufacturing  industries) and possibly construction  would tend to be
characterized  by less  elastic  labor  demands  than is  the case for  many of
the broad group of industries that comprise the Polish urban economy.
Thus  the  influence  of  labor  demand  parameters  on  the  relative
responsiveness of  wages  to  housing  shortages also  appears  to  be
consistent  with estimatea  patterns  across industrial  groups.
In evaluating the magnitude of the estimated  wage impacts of
housing  shortages,  it is informative  to compare  the estimated  impacts  to
those associated  with shifts in the industrial  mix among voivodships.
For a shift in the aggregate  industry  mix to have an equivalent  effect
on the aggregate  wage as eliminating the average housing shortage,  a
region would  need  to  have  100  percent of  its  employment in  the
industrial  sector,  about three times the national average,  or about 50
percent of total employment in construction,  more than six times the
national  average.  The same calculation  for the industrial  wage reveals
that a region would need to have about 65 percent of its industrial
employment  in the highest-wage  energy ard fuel sector,  about 10 times
the national average employment in that sector.  The actual range of
employment  in the  energy and fuels sector  is from  one percent  to fifty-
one  percent,  so the  housing  shortage  is estimated  to  have as much  effect
on the average  industrial  wage as if  a voivodship  moved fr m the lowest
to the  highest  employment  share  of the  highest-wage  sector.-7/
17/  Exceptions to this are that much state housing is restricted to
low-income  households,  and a form  of housing  allowance,  Social  Aid,
goes  only  to low-income  households.- 24 -
The foregoing results suggest that the influence  of housing
shortages  on labor markets in Poland is quite large,  with depressing
effects  on place-to-place  mobility  and  a resulting  tendency  on the part
of certain  industries  to offer  compensatory  wage differentials  in order
to offset  the  high costs  and  disutility  imposed  by those  shortages. The
effect of  these disruptions in  the Polish labor market  is almost
certainly  to diminish  overall  productivity  and aggregate  incomes.  For
example,  even though  labor  and factor  markets  in the  Polish  economy  are
undoubtedly  far  from competitive,  and hence  it is not  likely that
relative wage  levels perfectly mirror relative differences in  the
marginal  productivity  of labor,  it is nevertheless  likely  to  be the  case
that, in general,  high wages will be found in places  with higher  than
average  marginal  productivity. Hence,  if there is evidence  that labor
is inhibited  from  moving  to those  areas  because  of housing  shortages  or
other  reasons,  it is likely  that significant  economic  costs  in terms  of
foregone  productivity  will  be incurred. While  calculating  the  magnitude
of such costs is beyond  the scope  of this paper,  there  is little  doubt
that do exist, and that they represent  only one of several sorts of
economy-wide economic  costs  that  are  incurred as  a  result  of
inappropriate  housing  policy.
VI.  CONCLUSIONS  AND POLICY  IMPLICATIONS
The evidence is strong that housing policies  in Poland  have
major  deleterious  consequences  for  macroeconomic  performance. Among  the
consequences  are foregoing  high return investments,  depressing  savings
incentives,  and distorting labor markets and migration in ways that
cause wage  differentials to  be  higher  than  they would  be  under
competitive  conditions.  While general equilibrium  analysis  would be
required  to establish  precisely  the  economic  costs  of these  distortions,
it is clear that they are collectively  large and represent  a serious
penalty  for  a misguided  housing  policy. While short-run  economic  policy
in Poland should  undoubtedly  focus on dealing with external  economic
relations,  a longer-term  strategy  for Poland's  economic  recovery  should
include  major reforms  in policies  affecting  the housing  sector.  Among
these reforms  are an  increase  in resource  allocation  to the housing
sector,  an expanded  role for the private  housing sector,  restructured
housing subsidies, and  an  increased supply of  building materials.
Benefits  should  be felt in  an increased  return  on aggregate  investment,
lowered  housing  prices,  greater  domestic  resource  mobilization,  improved
operation  of labor  markets,  and  more appropriate  wage structures.
A.  Increase  Resource  Allocation  to the  Housing  Sector
A  compelling argument can  be made  that investment in the
housing  sector  is too low based on observed  housing  deficits,  current
investment levels relative to historical trends, investment levels
relative  to those  of other  countries  at similar  levels  or with similar
housing  deficits  in the  recent  past,  high  market  prices  in relation  to- 25 -
production  costs,  and  the  unfavorable  macroeconomic  consequences  of such
underinvestment.
Increasing  infrastructure investment must  be  seen  as  an
integral  part of increasing  resource  allocation  to the housing  sector.
Housing  cooperative  officials, municipal  officials, and  building
construction  firms all indicate  that underinvestment  in infrastructure
results in less housing throughput.  Also, as in the case of housing,
comparisons  of market prices  of urbanized  land to land seivicing  costs
suggest  high incremental  rates of return to investments  in technical
infrastructure  for  residential  development.
B.  Expand  the  Role of the  Private  Housing  Sector
The private  housing sector  could  play a significantly  greater
role  in  housing  supply.  The  number  of  private dwellings under
construction  (about  300,000)  is higher now than ever before, but the
annual completion rate is only about 50,000 per year.  The average
gestation period of six years  is  highly unfavorable  compared to the
corresponding  period for publicly provided  housing, about 17 months.
Reasons for  this unfavorable showing by  the private sector involve
limitations  on  private credit, shortages  of building materials,  and
prohibitions  against  ownership  of more than one dwelling.  At present,
private  housing is predominantly  a rural phenomenon.  In urban areas,
construction  of single family  houses  by the private sector  (virtually
the  only  type  of  housing that  people are  allowed to  build)  is
constrained  by the lack  of urban infrastructure  and  appropriately  zoned
land.
Realizing  the  full  potential  of the  private  sector  will require
broad  and  fundamental reforms, although some  lesser  steps  could
significantly  improve  annual  output.  Among the changes  that should  be
considered  are: (1)  making  more credit  available  for  private  builders  at
a market  rate of interest,  (2) ensuring  adequate  building  supplies  and
establishing  mechanisms  whereby  the private  sector  could  bid resources
away from the socialized  sector,  (3) encouraging  development  of small
enterpreneurs in  the  building  trades and  production of  building
materials,  (4)  reducing  transfer  taxes  on the  private  sale  of dwellings,
(5)  encouraging innovation in  building materials to  permit  unit
construction  costs to fall, (6) providing  adequate infrastructure  to
privately owned  land  to  encourage development, and  (7)  removing
prohibitions  against  ownership  of more than one dwelling.  This latter
step,  in particular,  could  be expected  to lead to expansion  of capital
for  the  sector  out  of private  resources.
While the steps just listed would be expected to increase
private  entrepreneurial  incentives  to produce  housing,  several  changes
in policy  with respect  to the socialized  sector  would further  increase
private  incentives.  These  include:  (1)  reducing  the  level  of
cooperative and  possibly state housing subsidies, (2)  encouraging
greater reliance  on owner--rather  than tenant-type--cooperatives,  and
(3)  selling  off some  state  housing  to tenants,  as has recently  been  done- 26  -
in Hungary.  Reducing subsidies  would not  only reduce inflationary
pressures,  but would make private housing relatively  more competitive
with cooperative  and state  housing. The  latter  two  changes  would  create
more saleable  stock  of housing,  particularly  in urban areas,  and would
begin  to open  up the  market  for  housing. Selling  units  to tenants  would
have the  added  advantages  of reducing  future  subsidies  and  also  creating
a source  of funds  that  could  be used to provide  financing  for  additional
housing.
C.  Restructure  and  Reduce  Housing  Subsidies
There  are four  main problems  with the  housing  subsidy  system  in
Poland.  First, housing subsidies  are not "transparent"  and thus are
difficult to control and to target.  A large share of subsidies  are
implicit, off-budget transfers, or  represent contingent claims  on
government  resources.  Subsidized  interest,  especially  for cooperative
housing, and tax exempti  ns for enterprises  that provide housing for
workers are the most prominent  examples  of large  off-budget  subsidies.
Second,  subsidies  distort  prices,  creating  disincentives  for  production
of  private housing, creating artificial shortages,  and  raising the
market  price of  housing that becomes available.  Because of  the
generosity  of existing  housing subsidies,  many households  would prefer
to wait for long periods for housing in the socialized  sector  rather
than to enter the private  market,  which, in any case, is typified  by
prices that are not affordable  to most households.  Third, subsidies
reduce  incentives  to save.  Since savings  (required  down-payments)  are
only  a modest  part  of housing  costs,  and since  by  making  greater  savings
efforts  households  cannot  accelerate  the  date at which they  are able to
purchase  subsidized  housing,  households  are  not inclined  to make  greater
savings  efforts  than those  minimally  required  for cooperative  housing.
The aggregate  effect  of such  depressed  savings  incentives  may be quite
large, since  in  most  moderately developed countries the  principal
motivation for  household savings is  in  fact to  purchase housing.
Fourth, housing subsidies in  Poland have a  number of  inequitable
features. They  are, for example,  largely  unrelated  to income  18.  Thus
some high-income  families  receive large subsidies  and many low-income
families  not only receive no subsidies  but actually pay, through an
inflation  tax,  for  the  housing  of better  off  members  of society.
The government  is not unaware  of some of the problems  of the
existing  housing  subsidy  system,  and has indeed  begun  a cautious  reform
of a number  of subsidy  system  features. Reforms  are addressed  both to
reducing  subsidies  and to restructuring  them,  although  in each area far
more thorough  changes  appear  to be necessary.  While these  reforms  are
certainly  in the right direction,  they barely scratch the surface of
serious reform.  For  example, they leave untouched the off-budget
interest  subsidies  for cooperative  housing,  which,  as discussed  above,
are  not  only  almost  as large  as budgetary  subsidies  but  also  have  highly
undesirable fiscal consequences.  Changing the  amortization  period
without  changing  other  terms  of housing  loans  is thus  an inconsequential
reform.- 27 -
D.  Increase  the  Supply  of Building  Materials
Any  discussion  of  expanding  resources  for  housing  and
infrastructute in  Poland  quickly comes  to  the  issue  of  building
materials  shortages.  The solution  foreseen  by the Poles is to expand
rather  than to reallocate  production. In discussion  of the forthcoming
5-year  plan, it was claimed  that allowance  had been  made for  expanding
building materials production by  up  to  90  percent in middle-sized
building  materials  establishments.  A  September 1986  report  on
bottlenecks  in the industry  has apparently  considered  a wider range  of
alternatives  for dealing with supply constraints,  including  not only
increased  production,  but  also  reallocating  supply,  delaying
construction  in certain  sectors,  and increasing  imports. All of these
alternatives  are  worthy  of consideration.- 28 -
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THE  DATA
The data used in our analysis  of housing, labor  market, and
migration  flows  is  regional-level  data  from annual  statistical  yearbooks
published by  the  government's Central  Statistical Office  (CSO).
Although  commendably thorough, the  published  statistics do  have
omissions from year tc year.  For example,  regional  data on average
wages  are  available  only  for 1984  and 1985,  and  an indicator  of regional
housing shortage--households  per dwelling unit--is  available only in
1978,  1980,  and 1981.  Regional-level  data  on incomes,  housing  costs  and
prices,  and  households  was unavailable.
The subnational  region irn  Poland is called  a "voivodship"  or
district.  In 1975, the boundaries  of the voivodships  were altered  to
create  a total  of 49 voivodships  from  what had  been  22 voivodships. The
large cities in Poland--Warsaw,  Lodz, Krakow, and Poznan--with  their
surrounding  towns  are  also classified  as voivodships.
Six  types  of data  were used for  the  statistical  analysis:
1.  An indicator  of the housing shortage:  households  per 100
occupied  dwelling  units.
2.  Socialized and  private-sector  per-capita investments in
housing.
3.  Demographic variables--births, deaths,  marriages,  and
divorces per  1000 population--as  indicators of housing
needs.  The ratio  of births  per 1000 population  by deaths
per  1000  population  is  used  as a rough  indicator  of the  age
composition  of each  voivodship's  population. Marriages  per
1000 population  plus divorces  per 1000  population  is used
as a rough indicator  of new household  formation. Divorces
were added to marriages  because  some  divorces  would  create
additional  needs  for  housing.
4.  Net migration--positive  if net in-migration,  negative if
net out-migration--as  the  migration  variable.  Total in-
migration and  out-migration  figures by voivodship were
unavailable.
5.  Average monthly wages in the  socialized  sector for all
sectors, for  the  industrial sectors only, and  for  the
construction  sectors  only.- 29  -
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6.  Annual employment  for the total socialized  economy, for
four  aggregate  subsectors  (industry,  construction,
transportation  and communications,  and trade), and eight
industrial  subsectors  (energy  and  fuel,  metallurgy,
electrical  and other machinery,  chemicals,  minerals, pulp
and paper,  light industry,  and food processing). Data on
private-sector employment at  the  voivodship level  was
unavailable.  Nationally,  private employment  was about 30
percent of  total employment in 1986.  Earnings in the
private  non-farm  sector  are  as much  as twice  their  level  in
the  socialized  sector.
Relative measures of  the  wage,  the  housing shortage, and
demographic  variables  were constructed  as percentages  of the national
average values for those variables.  Employment shares in the four
aggregate  subsectors  (industry,  construction,  transportation and
communications,  and  trade) and the eight industrial  subsectors  were
constructed  as  percentage shares in  total employment  and  in  total
industrial  employment  respectively.- 30  -
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